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‘We are convinced that a central problem of the legislative process is that far too
many bills are introduced into Parliament in a state that is recognised — even,
we suspect, by Ministers — to be less than perfect.’
2 In short, ‘... bills are too
often introduced to Parliament “half-baked” and with a lot of the detail
insufficiently thought out ...’.
3
I would not mind were Parliament a competent cook, able to complete a
process started by government. Were that so, our elected representatives would
enhance the democratic process by the part they played in turning out the final
product. But the heat of parliamentary debate is rarely sufficient: what enters
Parliament half-baked usually emerges half-baked, or worse.
‘The weight and extent of the criticisms received is perhaps the most notable
feature of our enquiry.’
4 Criticism of legislation is as old as legislation itself.
King Edward the Sixth wished that ‘the superfluous and tedious statutes were
brought into one sum together, and made more plain and short, to the intent that
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men might better understand them’.
5 But ‘half-baked’ does not just refer to a
failure to achieve simplicity or clarity in legislation; it refers to the failure of
legislation to achieve its purpose of converting the aims and objectives of
government policy into practical rules to regulate our lives in a sophisticated
society.
What disturbs me is not the failure, but that Members of Parliament
apparently tolerate it. Even before the Hansard Society Commission, many have
criticised the process. Our legislators stand accused of failing in their central role
— to produce laws that achieve their purpose and are intelligible. That should
stir a response but, as yet, I see no concerted attempt to change matters; neither
do I hear anyone defend the way things are done, or argue that the criticism is
without foundation. Do those who represent us lack the will to do things
properly and well — something that should pervade our efforts in every field?
II. THE ROLE OF CONSULTATION
We elect a government to set an agenda and the direction. Our institutional
processes should enable the government to take informed and achievable
decisions and to translate those decisions into practical and intelligible law that
people understand and respect. ‘Consultation’ is part of achieving that result.
The Hansard Society Commission was ‘convinced that proper consultation
should play a central part in the preparation of bills ...’.
6 Few people disagree:
indeed, a substantial consultative process already exists. The Commission
records that consultative documents increased from 11 in 1976 to a peak of 288
in 1988, falling marginally to 232 in 1991.
7 However, this significantly
understates the amount of consultation that occurs. In the field with which I am
familiar — the tax field — the Revenue Departments and the Institute of
Taxation consult regularly, and this may be on more than 100 separate items
during a year.
Most consultation does not, however, involve any formal document:
‘consultation’ takes many forms with varying degrees of formality. For this
reason, the Hansard Society Commission concludes — in my view, correctly —
that we should not try to place consultation into a precise pattern or defined
steps. We need government to conduct consultation on agreed principles — ‘best
consultation practice’ — set out in guidelines.
8 The Department of Trade and
Industry has taken a first step with guidelines issued under its deregulation
initiative.
9
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But here is the conundrum: despite the explosive growth in consultation,
dissatisfaction with the legislative end-product is as strong as ever. This is
perhaps because, as the Commission records, ‘the overwhelming impression
from the evidence is that many of those most directly affected are deeply
dissatisfied with the extent, nature, timing and conduct of consultation on bills as
at present practised’.
10 Effective consultation for both government and
consultees is not a matter of finding consensus; it is an attitude of mind: a
willingness to listen, a chance to persuade, to change minds or to create respect
for alternative views.
III. GENUINE CONSULTATION
Mr Justice Webster describes the essence of consultation as ‘... the
communication of a genuine invitation to give advice and a genuine
consideration of that advice ...’.
11 The crucial word is ‘genuine’: government
must conduct consultation in a manner that convinces consultees that it is not
paying lip-service to the process, that it has not made up its mind, that it has
considered seriously consultees’ views, that the process can achieve a
constructive result.
This involves the government explaining the purpose and background of
consultation and what it is seeking to achieve; it must offer the opportunity for
consultees to disagree and to propose alternatives. Ministers will always
consider that there are some matters on which they have a political mandate; on
many matters, however, the government should be willing to consult, not just on
how something should be done, but on whether it should be done at all.
In any case, if the scope and nature of a review, or the basis on which the
government is conducting it, are unclear, consultees will merely oppose what
they fear will emerge, rather than consider constructively what might be done.
The more controversial the subject and the greater the vested interests involved,
the truer this is. We will have no satisfactory debate about VAT on books or
children’s clothing, or changing the taxation of dividends, unless we elevate such
issues above the ‘threat’ of change that is bandied about in the newspapers.
Representative bodies and commentators have a responsibility to respond
constructively. But government must create the environment for sensible debate.
And when the consultation is over, government should respond to consultees,
telling them what decisions it has reached, how and why it reached them and
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why it rejected alternative proposals.
12 The Cabinet Office summary of
responses to the Open Government White Paper is a step in this direction.
13
IV. AN OPEN PROCESS
These aspects of consultation are important but more is needed to ensure a
successful outcome. Ministers cannot be experts on all matters on which they
consult. They bring a perspective to the decision-making process, based on their
experience and political judgement. Their decisions, however, depend upon the
quality of the advice they receive.
Asking people’s views is an essential component in the process but
government must test the status and validity of the views expressed. The quality
of advice depends upon the quality of its assessment and the way it is presented.
The quality of the assessment depends upon research and the information that is
available to government. The reputation of the Institute for Fiscal Studies is no
happy accident: it is founded upon the quality of its research.
I share the view of the Chief Economist of the Bank of England, Mervyn
King: openness in the giving of advice increases credibility and accountability.
The publication of the Bank of England’s Inflation Report discloses the research
basis for the Bank’s views on monetary policy. The advice the Bank gives on
that subject is clear, now that the Chancellor publishes the minutes of his
monthly monetary meetings with the Governor. King (1994) notes that
[t]here is one further important consequence of openness and transparency — greater
public accountability of the Bank.... There will not be any doubt about the advice tendered
by the Bank.... One consequence of greater public accountability has been the spur to
improved performance within the Bank. The publication of our analysis and advice is a
great incentive to getting it right. I am one of those who believe that the strongest incentive
to provide good economic advice is the prospect of having to defend that advice in public.
What works for economic advice can work for other forms of advice;
openness can raise standards. Publication ensures that we see when advice, and
the information on which it is based, are correct; it allows us to correct what is
wrong. In the end, we should respect good advice openly given and backed by
proper information and research; our respect for those who give the advice and
for the decisions that Ministers base on it should increase.
One function Ministers must fulfil is to make judgements between conflicting
views, and Civil Servants may have to defend Ministers’ decisions, whatever the
advice. Accordingly, government may not always be ready to bare its soul to the
world. Nevertheless, while the information upon which Ministers base their
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decisions remains undisclosed, the doubt will linger whether the final decision
was correctly based; so long as we do not know what report Ministers receive of
consultations, consultees will harbour the suspicion that their views were
inadequately understood or presented.
The discipline that openness imposes applies equally to consultees. The
Association of First Division Civil Servants ‘was critical of the nature and
quality of some of the responses that departments received when they sought to
consult outside bodies’.
14 In an open process, we can recognise ill-informed or
partisan views for what they are. Of course, vested interests may openly seek
support through a public lobby. Such lobbies frequently shed little light on a
subject and may reflect government’s failure to create the environment for
sensible debate and to explain the issues. But special pleading often operates to
best effect behind closed doors.
V. TIME AND RESOURCES
‘At the heart of the problem is the inherent conflict between the need, for the
assumed public good and for political impact, to get a bill on the statute book
without unwanted delay ... and the need to “get it right”’.
15 In short, time is a
problem. It takes time to prepare the policy and identify the desired approach.
The details then have to be filled in. At every stage, however, there is a trade-off
between discussion and action. Time is limited because political horizons are
short; we only give a government five years in which to set an agenda and the
direction. The horizons of particular Ministers may be shorter still, as they
anticipate moving between departments.
Nevertheless, a sure way for consultation to fail is to set an unrealistic
timetable. Consultees will oppose change where they have no confidence that a
sensible outcome is possible in the time allowed. Such exercises merely waste
time and resources. At its heart, however, time, or lack of it, is a function of the
task in hand, the number of other tasks to which you have committed yourself
and the resources that you can deploy. Frequently the real problem is not time
alone, but the failure by government correctly to balance these elements.
Government takes on more than it can deliver satisfactorily with the resources
that it is prepared to commit in the time allowed.
VI. COMPLEXITY OF LEGISLATION
The availability, or lack, of trained draftsmen should place a constraint on
legislative output but it seems not to. Parliamentary Counsel ‘have to work under
pressures and constraints which make it very difficult for them, with the best will
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in the world, to produce simple and clear legislation. They are inadequately
staffed and are often given gigantic tasks to perform in a race against time’.
16
What the Renton Committee noted in 1975 is true in 1994.
Parliamentary Counsel are more than just draftsmen; they are Counsel who
advise government whether its policy stands up to objective scrutiny and is
attainable. I believe that they fulfil this wider role too late in the day. Their
contribution should come earlier, as government formulates its proposals.
However, lack of resources makes it impossible for Counsel to involve
themselves at that earlier stage.
Complexity of legislation is not just a matter of drafting style; fundamentally,
it stems from the policy that the draftsman must convert into legislation. This is
true in many areas; in taxation matters I have previously noted:
17
There are many reasons for complexity, but at the heart of the matter, complexity stems
from the policy that underlies the tax system. You can tinker with the detail but you can
never tackle the fundamental complexity of the tax system without looking closely at the
underlying policy. The complexity of the tax system stems from what you are trying to tax,
and how you set about doing so. If you try to tax something that is difficult to tax, the
system will become increasingly complex as year after year you try to defend the integrity
of the system.
Income tax illustrates this: ‘... income is, in the last analysis, a subjective
concept whose size depends on the judgement of the accountants who compile it
and the particular purposes for which the measure will be used ... Income, in
short, is a necessary concept but one which cannot be given the precision or
objectivity that some of its uses might require’.
18 ‘Income’ in the context of
taxation requires precision and objectivity. It is the search for precision and
objectivity that is the source of our difficulties with the tax and its avoidance.
VII. DRAFTING STYLE
Given the policy of income tax, I agree with Gladstone that ‘[t]o bring the
construction of these laws [of income tax] within the reach of [persons who have
not received a legal education] was no doubt extremely desirable, but far from
easy ...’.
19 But the late Presiding Special Commissioner, Hubert Monroe, was
right to add a plea to Gladstone’s statement: ‘... that it would be some advance if
laws of this kind were intelligible to those who have received a legal
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education’.
20 Practitioners may have difficulty understanding such laws but
Butterworths Tax Handbooks and competing publications at least allow them
access to current tax legislation. The Hansard Society Commission wishes to see
easier access to all current legislation through a statute law data base. The Lord
Chancellor’s Department has made progress with plans for a modernised process
of publication of updated statute law but progress must be maintained.
Organising legislation, however, is just a first step: beyond that, there are
things that we can do with the layout of legislation — and not just tax legislation
— to provide a better route map through the legislative jungle. I would expect
Members of Parliament to welcome and encourage such changes as aiding their
own role. My particular criticism of recent tax legislation is its ‘holistic’
approach: you cannot understand one section until you can understand them all.
Imagine reading a book where your understanding of each chapter depended
upon your having read and understood all its chapters; I do not think that the
book would become a best seller. Mastering such legislation is a costly
intellectual effort — costly mainly for the clients of professional firms.
Proposals to simplify legislation deserve the attention of MPs and those who
instruct Parliamentary Counsel.
21 It may take time to tackle more fundamental
causes of complexity but we can make progress by improving the organisation,
language and layout of legislation. The draftsman should approach any piece of
legislation as if he were telling a story, rather than making a jigsaw that users
must painstakingly piece together. However, a draftsman can only tell a story if
the government gives him a clear plot. I return, therefore, to the need for
satisfactory consultation and advice: their value is readily apparent at the
drafting stage; involving the draftsman earlier rather than later contributes to
rather than detracts from the process.
VIII. THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
However, a more fundamental issue lurks behind how the draftsman approaches
his task. In 1975, the Renton Committee (para. 19.41) concluded
... that interpretation of Acts drafted in a simpler, less detailed and less elaborate style than
at present would present no great problems provided that the underlying purpose and the
general principles of the legislation were adequately and concisely formulated. The real
problem is one of confidence. Would Parliament be prepared to trust the courts?
The answer as yet appears to be that Parliamentarians do not trust the judges to
give effect satisfactorily to clear statements of principle.
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It may be that Parliament has not always worked out the principle that does
underlie particular legislation. We cannot, however, blame the draftsman for
reflecting the legal traditions that have led us to seek legislative certainty
through detailed provision. He must take account of what he knows to be the
courts’ interpretative approach to legislation. Should Parliament take the
initiative in seeking a change in style? Or must the courts and the legal
profession provide a lead in changing legal traditions and attitudes and
interpretative approaches?
This chicken-and-egg situation may yet be resolved by the European cuckoo:
as the influence of the European Union on our legislation grows, the different
traditions of European law may force us to change our ways, to accept a greater
use of statements of principle and to adopt a different interpretative approach. I
do not underestimate the task involved in resolving the clash of English and
European legal cultures — certainty versus the logical formulation of an idea.
The latter may tell us the principle involved — or where the negotiation stopped
— but may give us little idea of the answer to a particular problem. Attempts by
the English draftsman to provide the answer in detailed legislation may merely
perpetuate the cultural differences or be doomed to founder in the European
Court.
However, at present we increasingly get the worst of all worlds: complex and
detailed but unintelligible legislation, and no statement of principle to guide us.
This produces the view that ‘... a code of practice will be more effective than
freedom of information legislation in changing administrative culture ... The
Code will be less legalistic and confrontational than a statutory approach where
private rights are not at issue. Review and interpretation will be more flexible,
with less scope for legal costs and delays’.
22 This sentiment is reflected in the
growth of unappealable discretion in areas of our tax law. The Special
Committee of Tax Law Consultative Bodies rejects a ‘flexible basis of law’
23
that relies on ministerial or departmental statement: ‘Ministerial statement is not
an acceptable way of “clarifying” unclear legislation ... It is also unacceptable to
frame legislation in unclear or excessively wide terms on the basis that its scope
and application will be subject to an interpretative statement by the Revenue
Department concerned’.
24
The time and expense of resorting to law should suggest changing our
approach to legislation and the legal system; the legal profession may need to
respond to the accusation that the system is expensive and slow and lacks
flexibility but these have never been good arguments for denying legal rights.
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Clear principles of law should provide flexibility, shape administrative culture
and be the foundation of codes of practice.
IX. SECONDARY LEGISLATION
Legislation is not easier to draft because it is secondary rather than primary
legislation. We cannot, therefore, circumvent the problems of primary legislation
by relying more on secondary legislation. Secondary legislation can deal with the
detail of legislation, but to do so it still requires the resources of skilled
draftsmen and a satisfactory process.
The Deregulation and Contracting Out Bill currently before Parliament
empowers Ministers, as part of the government’s deregulation initiative, to make
orders amending or repealing primary legislation. I believe that such ministerial
powers are undesirable. Nevertheless, the procedure that such orders will follow
provides a blueprint for secondary legislation. The process has a number of
elements: public consultation must precede the laying of such orders; the
government must report the results of that consultation to Parliament and give
justification for its proposals; Parliamentary Committees will examine the
proposals and be empowered to take evidence; both Houses will vote on the
orders.
25
Secondary legislation allows us to escape the restrictive timetable that
Finance Bills must follow.
26 The procedure of the Deregulation Bill contains
several elements that the Special Committee of Tax Law Consultative Bodies
has proposed for the use of secondary legislation in the tax field, based on clear
policy and principles in primary legislation.
27
X. CONCLUSION
‘A central theme of our inquiry is that the legislative process must be seen as a
whole. Although it is convenient to list separate stages in the process, these are
interrelated and interactive ... One cannot say where the legislative process
starts; it is a seamless robe.’
28 Consultation is relevant at all stages of the
process, from policy formulation to implementation. But no amount of
consultation on how we implement legislation can correct hasty legislation that
is fundamentally deficient; better legislation cannot improve poor policy work.
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Government must balance the tasks it launches with the time and resources
that it is prepared to commit to them. It can improve how it consults,
remembering that
... the purpose of consultation is to enable the government to make informed decisions.
Consultation by itself is not enough to achieve this. The institutions ... available to
Government must be such as: bring together a range of background, skills and experience;
have the capacity and resources to undertake detailed statistical and analytical work; seek
out satisfactorily the impact and implications of the proposals; [and] identify and listen to
the different views on them.
29
The success of our institutions in achieving these ends remains shrouded in
secrecy. The incentive for good advice is its openness to scrutiny.
Many believe that the way we make our law is unsatisfactory. A lack of
concern for the accuracy of the law, and of respect for what it says or does or for
the institutions that make it, are insidious influences to have at large. Institutions
that fail to reform risk being swept aside. Without change, Parliament risks its
role in the legislative process becoming increasingly irrelevant. The Hansard
Society Commission recommended that ‘... the Government should make every
effort to get bills in a form fit for enactment, without major alteration, before
they are presented to Parliament; in the Government’s review of the legislative
process, this should be a first and overriding objective’.
30 This recognises that
proper planning and attention to detail are vital. It also implicitly suggests that
Parliament may have little part but to agree to what government proposes. The
development of the European Union as a source of legislation only lends greater
urgency to the need for Parliament to define its role in the modern legislative
process.
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